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UNMAKING A NATIONAL SPACE LEGISLATION FOR
INDIA: INDIGENIZING SPACE LAW THROUGH




This article addresses, in a framework, the efforts to make na-
tional space legislation for India. It identifies that such efforts
are in a forgetfulness of the indigenous specialties of the Indian
Space Program, particularly of its science which has India ad-
vancing in space technology. All efforts in making a national
space legislation have become an imitation of efforts elsewhere
because of their absorption in the otherness of epistemologies
foreign to the Indian self. The article recognizes that, for the
continued success of India as a space faring nation, legislation
or policy, as the case may be, needs to recover the indigeneity of
the science of the Indian Space Program. Hence, this article
builds a framework that can challenge the misguided ambitions
of the advocates of national space legislation. It also includes an
Indian narrative on human space exploration based on the na-
tional experience of India on matters relating to space. The arti-
cle also proposes means for India to continue to fare in space
through a reimagined triad of science, legislation, and policy.
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I. INTRODUCTION
SINCE THE INAUGURATION of the Indian Space Program(ISP), the science on which it is based has a characteristic of
“indigeneity” to it. “Indigenous science” is based on the cultural
characteristic of a nation that results in a refusal to share areas
colonized by mainstream Western science. The pioneers of In-
dian space science such as Vikram Sarabhai and Satish Dhawan,
and later A.P.J. Abdul Kalam, envisioned and practiced a space
program for India based on scientific self-sufficiency through lo-
calized advanced technology. Their down-to-earth approach de-
fined space technology as a means for helping humanity in its
collective self-becoming. They placed technology at the services
of humanity, which contrasts starkly to the totalizing approach
of Western science. However, does India’s current space policy
properly mirror the indigeneity of India’s sciences? Or does it
more closely resemble international space law (which is a West-
ern artifact based on a war-and-peace framework) in abject re-
jection to the high ideals of the ISP? Considerations like these
cannot be overlooked—especially since India is currently fram-
ing national space legislation.
This article creates a comprehensive argument so that any fu-
ture legal activity regarding national space legislation for India
does not ignore the ontology of Indian space science. Part I ar-
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gues that, amid many other scientific approaches, the Western
science of the Cartesian-Newtonian model has eclipsed other
sciences through its violent claims of superiority. It explains
briefly how Western science became “the-science” by marginaliz-
ing indigenous sciences.
In Part II, this article argues that human space exploration is
primarily based on “the-science” and that the violence of such is
ingrained in the exploration and use of outer space, the moon,
and other celestial bodies. In that advance, space science has
developed a consciousness that alienates basic human values,
and instead submits itself to the service of markets.
Part III demonstrates how the science of the ISP differs funda-
mentally from Western science. It explains that the indigeneity
is a key characteristic of the ISP, and that it follows the ontologi-
cal realities of the universe and the socioeconomic conditions of
the people of India (as opposed to having the highly-politicized
hegemonic worldview of the international space program).
Lastly, this part provides a general Indian narrative of space ex-
ploration through the works of Indian space scientists Vikram
Sarabhai, Homi J. Bhabha, Satish Dhawan, and A.P.J. Abdul
Kalam.
In Part IV, the article delves further into international space
law, and how it is a product of bipolar politics and consensual
diplomacy, far off from the philosophy of the ISP. The science
underlying international space law is the “big science” of politi-
cal nationalism. In using big science, international space law has
forged a tense forum for the once-Cold War combatants to
flaunt power to one another.
Part V deliberates national space legislation for India and its
current efforts. Its primary objective is to analyze the ISP’s scien-
tific uniqueness. It critically reviews the work done up until
now—which is caught between a madness for modernity and the
classicism of international law—and yields results that skew the
ISP from its characteristic indigeneity. Therein, the article asks
what is rarely asked—Why does India not have national space legisla-
tion? Part V argues that the ISP was better off before, and that
the current demand for national space legislation is based on
misconceptions about the role of law. Finally, the article pro-
vides some suggestions to nonetheless streamline national space
legislation, if at all, to include the visions of the ISP, particularly,
to sustain and protect the indigenous science as has always been
before. In this scheme, it is the organic science of the ISP that
becomes the paradigm for any possible renewal.
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II. THE VIOLENCE OF WESTERN SCIENCE: “THE-
SCIENCE” AND “SUCH-AND-SUCH SCIENCES”
The objectivity of science is largely undisputed. Further, little
deliberation is given to the fact that scientific objectivity is se-
cured by social concerns.1 Such a socialness of science instantly
requires itself to consider human wellbeing in the world.
Perhaps the socialness of science is a matter of conversation
among the few scientists who take pleasure in self-infliction. But
a certain few skeptics, who may be branded as “sinners of sci-
ence,” have taken the absoluteness of science simply as a given, a
self-referentiality. Hence, they search for science in cultural plu-
ralities—science of “such-and-such” culture, science of such-and-
such civilization. But then amid them the mighty Western sci-
ence that has self-proclaimed itself as the-science, falsely singu-
lar, yet totalizing (and colonizing) all such and such sciences.
On that note, the “the-science” clean image of Western sci-
ence claims that it has the means to find the truth. However, this
assertion is only found by dominating other scientific ap-
proaches that often toil in the name of human development.
“The-science” thus instills in its users what Michel Serres calls,
“the unbearable pride of a possessive and domineering science,”
and an “arrogance” which is in contrast to a devoted enthusiasm
to know the marvels of nature.2 This conceitedness of “the-sci-
ence” makes it dangerous.
In its assertion in what conveniently appeases power, “the-sci-
ence” has espoused the means of violence. Its violent ways are
hidden in its claims of standing for worldly peace (while it in
fact forges a war-peace framework, which is in fact a peace-
through-war analytic). In order to ensure human wellbeing,
“the-science,” kills hundreds of thousands of “lesser animals”:
frogs, rats, and pigs have bled on lab tables for human wellbe-
ing.3 To promote human development on this planet, “the-sci-
ence” has vandalized nature; trees, rivers, and mountains have
been wiped out to give humans cozy habitats. Valleys, liveli-
hoods, and downstream ecosystems have been destroyed for
1 See generally HELEN E. LONGINO, SCIENCE AS SOCIAL KNOWLEDGE: VALUES AND
OBJECTIVITY IN SCIENTIFIC INQUIRY 3–14, 66–69 (1990).
2 See CATHERINE LARRE`RE, Ethics, Politics, Science, and the Environment: Concerning
the Natural Contract, in EARTH SUMMIT ETHICS: TOWARD A RECONSTRUCTIVE
POSTMODERN PHILOSOPHY OF ENVIRONMENTAL EDUCATION 115, 120 (J. Baird Calli-
cott & Fernando J.R. da Rocha eds., 1996).
3 M.K. GANDHI, HIND SWARAJ: THE SELECTED WORKS OF MAHATMA GANDHI 123
(1968).
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constructing dams and hydroelectric projects. In order to en-
sure worldly peace, “the-science” has assisted in dropping bombs
to wipe away anyone rebelling against peace. Whatever neutral-
ity “the-science” claims is a sham. As Shiv Viswanathan puts it,
either that science is subverted by politics, or that science’s per-
versions come into play when once it begins to dictate society.
Let us focus on the former of Visvanathan’s two-part state-
ment, that science, which is otherwise serene and pacified, is
subverted by virulent political forces of the social world. Ashish
Nandy has a similar forethought on the politicization of science:
“May the sources of violence [of science] lie partly in the nature
of science itself? Is there something in modern science itself
which makes it a human enterprise particularly open to co-opta-
tion by the powerful and the wealthy?”4 Perhaps, yes. But note,
science invited people of the world to instrumentalize for their
own self-indulgence, for science promises to become the best
instrument to ensure the continuity of hedonism. It is the con-
sistency of science with sensual self-indulgence, and the promise
for material bliss, that perhaps caused science to become the
instrument of politics?
The second view of Visvanathan is that science, which is other-
wise disciplined, turns unruly when it becomes an opportunity
for social ordering. This is particularly evident from the role
played by science in the “civilizing mission” of the imperial pow-
ers. The modernist approach of science annihilated the indige-
nous sciences that had been used to improve the quality of life
of the peoples in the colonies. For example, biology distorted
indigenous life sciences through the process of, what Londa
Schiebinger calls, “bioprospecting.”5 Specifically, the Western
scientific standards of hygiene and sanitation as portrayed in sci-
entific media reduced the indigenous practice of hygiene to a
glorified uncleanliness. The “scientific racism” of these forces
forged pseudoscience to demote any inquiries that were part of
a primitively scientific culture.6 Science thus became the cham-
pion of the politics of knowledge.
Visvanathan concludes his critique with the observation that
science as it is today—highly politicized and bureaucratized—
4 Ashis Nandy, Introduction: Science as a Reason of State, in SCIENCE, HEGEMONY,
AND VIOLENCE: A REQUIEM FOR MODERNITY 2 (Ashis Nandy ed., 1988).
5 Suman Seth, Putting Knowledge in Its Place: Science, Colonialism, and the
Postcolonial, 12 POSTCOLONIAL STUD. 373–74, 378–79 (2009).
6 Id. at 375.
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represents a “crisis of conscience.”7 Not only has science lost its
innocence and civility, but it also has become “allergic to de-
mocracy.”8 “What should have been a partnership of openness
[has] become a dull civics, where ‘the scientific method’ as an
ideology became a Victorian corset constricting creativity.”9
“The-science’s” violent and perverse tendency to totalize
knowledge does not and should not deny the existence and
worth of “such-and-such sciences.” This term signifies the idea
that there are knowledges here, there, and elsewhere, that are
scientific in the puritan, non-Western sense of the term. These
knowledges are savagely indigenous from Western views of sci-
ence, and provide alternative paradigms to “the-science.” This
alternativeness stems from the culture of its nation of origin. As
Gandhi intended in Hind Swaraj, the “tinsel splendour of glass-
ware” cannot dazzle a community that has found aesthetic satis-
faction in the serene flame of “handmade earthen saucers.”10
He holds that true science is an experiment on the self rather
than on the other, and science should help mankind to come
closer to its maker.11 This approach is a holism wherein science
helps the microcosm in a relative existence to persistently try to
relate its Heideggerian “everydayness” to an all-encompassing
cosmic macrocosm. Their overlying theme is to achieve the union
between the microcosm and the macrocosm through right
knowledge and right practices. In that scheme of things, the
role of scientists lies “neither with the exploiting market nor
with the stifling state, but with the people,” and in tenderly nurs-
ing them to recover from the vices of the material world.12
III. “THE-SCIENCE” AS THE SCIENCE OF SPACE
EXPLORATION
Earlier space science, through its policies, is defined as the
knowledge meant to conquer the distant spaces of the cosmos.
The conquest was meant to demystify the exoticism that was at-
tached to the spaces above the earth, in what Hannah Arendt
7 See SHIV VISVANATHAN, A CARNIVAL FOR SCIENCE: ESSAYS ON SCIENCE, TECHNOL-
OGY, AND DEVELOPMENT 148–50 (1997).
8 SHIV VISVANATHAN, THEATRES OF DEMOCRACY: BETWEEN THE EPIC AND THE EVE-
RYDAY 255 (2016).
9 Id.
10 GANDHI, supra note 3, at 158.
11 See Shambu Prasad, Towards an Understanding of Gandhi’s Views on Science, 36
ECON. & POL. WEEKLY 3721, 3724–25 (2001).
12 Id. at 3730.
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depicts as the “rebellion against human existence.”13 In other
words, the conquest of outer space is the ultimate conquest for
science: of not only the physical spaces outside the earth but
also the meta-spaces of human minds which intimately believed
that the cosmos—its crystalline planets and stars—belonged to
them.14 For scientists, such sentiments are too lay; for them,
“man is no more than an observer of the universe in its manifold
manifestations.”15
Norman Mailer denounces the goals of space science in the
same vein as Arendt, that the conquest of space is seen as the
means to salvage humanity from its “metaphysical pits.”16
Though this in fact was an effort at de-romanticizing the cos-
mos, supporters of space conquest called the ambition of space
sciences a desire to demystify humanity from the awful exoticism
surrounding the cosmos, and by conquering it, to ground it on
human utility. Scientists deemed it as the glory of modern sci-
ence, says Arendt, “that it has been able to emancipate itself
[and its followers] completely from all such anthropocentric,
that is, truly humanistic concerns.”17 Thus space science made
its materialist beginning by proclaiming to disconnect humanity
from its romanticism. The scientists rejected as old-style and re-
dundant the perspective that cosmic harmony, the actual uni-
verse, is an ontological category of the non-dualism of mind and
matter. Instead, holding on to a rational dualism, they held that
one would “have to step outside any merely given sequence or
series of occurrences if they wanted to discover the overall
beauty and order of the whole, that is, the universe.”18 Worse
was yet to come: science thenceforth told mothers not to tell
their children that stars are serene twinkling diamonds, but
rather fireballs emitting heat flares.
The first conception of space science was the science of rock-
ets. Early applications of rocket science include, for example,
the Chinese using gunpowder in tubes that were attached to ar-
rows of fire to attack targets, applying the Newtonian third law
13 HANNAH ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION 2 (1958).
14 See Hannah Arendt, The Conquest of Space and the Stature of Man, 18 THE NEW
ATLANTIS: J. OF TECH. & SOC’Y 43, 44–45, 51–54, http://www.thenewatlantis.com/
publications/the-conquest-of-space-and-the-stature-of-man [https://perma.cc/
49UR-MS3D].
15 Id. at 44.
16 NORMAN MAILER, OF A FIRE ON THE MOON 471 (1970).
17 Arendt, supra note 14, at 43.
18 Id. at 48.
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of motion.19 Later on, Robert H. Goddard, known as the father
of modern rocket science demonstrated the application
through the “bazooka” and subsequently offered to extend its
scope to the U.S. Navy for their on-field activities.20 The leitmo-
tif for furthering research in rocket science for Goddard was ef-
fective warring, as he stated in A Method of Reaching Extreme
Altitudes: “Smokeless power rockets, during World War II, have
grown in size and controllability, but have not given much
higher jet velocities than were earlier obtained. Multiple charge,
or reloading powder rockets appear still to be [developed].”21
Thus, rocket science began by exploring the possibilities of
destruction and violence. Elsewhere, some of the early rockets
like V-2s were given the technical ability to travel 300 kilometers
to destroy civilian and military targets. There was also a danger-
ous optimism that surrounded this discovery:
[T]he postwar period became the age of the rocket; it actually
began during World War II, with the use of rockets in aircraft, to
supplement artillery, and with the German development of the
V2 long-range ballistic rocket. By the 1960s ballistic rockets had
achieved greater accuracy and extended their range to over
5,000 miles. Such missiles still defied antiaircraft defense and
could carry a nuclear warhead far more powerful than the two
bombs dropped in World War II.22
Rocket science thus ripened to a state of salience through World
War II, the violent elements of which would remain with rocket
science. Even on a more operational level, the action force,
thrust, and the reaction force based on Newton’s Third Law of
Motion roll together to make rocket launch have a certain vio-
lent force.
With rockets all around, in 1957, space science succeeded in
the first satellite launch, the launch of Sputnik. Policy circles cel-
ebrated Sputnik and its science as a power-gain. Proclamations of
such a power-gain by the launchers of Sputnik, and the laying
down of policies on the possible utilization of space power by
the gainers put the rest in qualms about the impending risk of
space programs. In the United States, President Eisenhower was
urged by the American scientific and policy intelligentsia to
19 STEVEN OTFINOSKI, ROCKETS 11 (2007).
20 See Dr. Robert H. Goddard: American Rocketry Pioneer, NASA GODDARD SPACE
FLIGHT CTR. (Rob Garner ed., Aug. 4, 2017), http://www.nasa.gov/centers/god-
dard/about/history/dr_goddard.html [https://perma.cc/K5K3-LQH7].
21 ROBERT H. GODDARD, ROCKETS: TWO CLASSIC PAPERS ix (2002).
22 ARCHER JONES, THE ART OF WAR IN THE WESTERN WORLD 597 (1987).
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enter into a dialectic of science with the Soviet Union to ensure
the participation of the United States in the space race.23 This
was followed by strategic reforms in science education that fo-
cused on developing a utility-based high science that can be
equally useful to the U.S. government.24 Soon, through the Na-
tional Defense Education Act, 1958, the Eisenhower Administra-
tion gathered the brightest students with the most scientific
ingenuity and acumen to participate in the production of high
science and help the government in its dialectic war of science-
power; as the Act lays down, “[t]o strengthen the national de-
fense and to encourage and assist in the expansion and im-
provement of educational programs to meet critical national
needs; and for other purposes.”25 This degradation of science to
a utility-function, in abject neglect of the joyful curiosity and
playfulness of the scientists of an era, however, was subject to
criticism by American scholars, writes Hans J. Morgenthau:
[T]he commitment of unmatchable resources for certain scien-
tific and technological projects chosen by the government exerts
a well-nigh irresistible attraction upon scientific and industrial re-
search. Thus the direction of scientific exploration and techno-
logical innovation is no longer left to the free interplay of
intellectual curiosity and technical ingenuity but is predeter-
mined by the interests and the power of the government.26
Science soon became a language for speaking power among the
nations, and space science developed into a privileged posses-
sion, prompting all powers-seekers in a war of physics in the
politics of “big science.”27
Within a few years, the U.S. Apollo Missions added a fillip to
the big science project. Apollo, in fact, became a realization of
the dialectic advantage the United States was looking for in the
dialectic of science with the Soviet Union. It was also a dialecti-
cal match for the scientific nationalism that the launch of Sput-
nik and Yuri Gagarin’s space travel had infused among the
23 WAYNE J. URBAN, MORE THAN SCIENCE AND SPUTNIK: THE NATIONAL DEFENSE
EDUCATION ACT OF 1958 80–81 (2010).
24 Id. at 156–59.
25 National Defense Education Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-864, 72 Stat. 1580,
http://wwwedu.oulu.fi/tohtorikoulutus/jarjestettava_opetus/Troehler/NDEA_
1958.pdf [https://perma.cc/AF2W-F42S].
26 Hans J. Morgenthau, Modern Science and Political Power, 64 COLUM. L. REV.
1386, 1392 (1964).
27 ZUOYUE WANG, IN SPUTNIK’S SHADOW: THE PRESIDENT’S SCIENCE ADVISORY
COMMITTEE AND COLD WAR AMERICA 142, 144 (2008).
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Soviet populace.28 Apollo gave Americans a similar sense of na-
tionalism, a confidence to speak and an imagination to act.29 At
the international level, the advantage that the United States
gained from the Apollo Mission provided an effective position
in the diplomatic negotiations that led to a legal framework for
the moon and other celestial bodies.
Meanwhile, in practice, on the functional scientific front,
space science split into fragments and further divided into scien-
tific projects for bids. The aristocracy of space science—its in-
herent inquisitiveness about the mysteries of the universe, its
closeness to the collective existence of humanity, and its satisfac-
tion of human curiosity—was lost as the many space sciences
began to compete for funding, as captured by an observer in
NASA:
The planetary science community preferred smaller, tested
spacecraft flying short missions over large, expensive, complex
and lengthy projects. They feared that the government might
cancel their smaller projects in times of tight budgets in favor of
a few expensive high-profile missions. Moreover, with small inex-
pensive spacecraft launched at relatively short intervals, scientists
could more easily follow up on new discoveries than they could
with one large complicated spacecraft that took many years of
preparation.30
Thus, space science in the United States, which otherwise
started on grand counterclaims against the security-centered So-
viet science, abashedly yielded to economic efficiency. This in
fact reduced American space science to items of convenience in
addition to the epistemological reduction of big science to cut-
rate technology.31
Today, in modernity, space science is a bearer of historical
consciousness. That consciousness has distanced itself from
human considerations of all it has become, the grimmest is its
role as a medium of political communication between power-
blocs. It also has a meanness—stemming from the freedom it
has from human-specific values—such that by using it, the most
destructive ambitions can be fulfilled. It masks its destructivity
28 See Asif A. Siddiqi, Competing Technologies, National(ist) Narratives, and Univer-
sal Claims: Toward a Global History of Space Exploration, 51 TECH. & CULTURE 425,
429–30 (2010).
29 Id. at 426, 430.
30 Andrew J. Butrica, Voyager: The Grand Tour of Big Science, in FROM ENGINEER-
ING SCIENCE TO BIG SCIENCE 251, 253–54 (Pamela E. Mack ed., 1998).
31 Id. at 253–55.
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behind the bigness (sheer quantity and magnitude of its sphere
of application) of its ambitions—”thou cannot gain without
pain.” Finally, as a postscript, space science today is neoliberal
and only meets market demands: all set to branch off to become
a well-nourished sidekick to a global greed.
IV. INDIGENEITY OF THE SCIENCE OF THE INDIAN
SPACE PROGRAM
The science of the ISP is based on the imagination of C.V.
Raman, that “science is material and spiritual wealth.”32 In the
same vein, Vikram Sarabhai, the father of the ISP and a disciple
of C.V. Raman, held dear the belief that India’s space program,
an integration of the nation’s cultural and civilizational aspira-
tions, shall be at the service of the nation and its peoples.33
Moreover, Sarabhai published his work in a Nerhuvian era,
wherein science was in search of an indigeneity. Amrita Shah
explains in her biography of Sarabhai: “[I]t had been fashiona-
ble for Indian scientists to design their research projects in such
a manner that some peculiarity or other of indigenous condi-
tions would be highlighted.”34 As the leader of the ISP,
Sarabhai’s vision was to empower India through a space science,
and of course the technology thereof, through scientific self-suf-
ficiency. Ajey Lele echoes Sarabhai’s vision: “[Sarabhai] stated
that India’s space programme would be civilian in nature, with a
focus on the application of space technology as a tool for do-
mestic socioeconomic development.”35 Further, Sarabhai be-
lieved that the real advancement in space science lies in making
space benefits available to the common populace.36 His initial
effort was to explore indigenous possibilities in realizing that
goal. This was in fact a desire to overcome the colonial abjection
of a left-behind poor economy. It was the dream of the early
men of the ISP that a turn to indigeneity would help them avoid
the horror of a technological re-colonization. This sentiment is
reflected in words of Sarabhai:
32 Sir Chandrasekhara Vankata Raman, An Indian Academy of Science, 1 CURRENT
SCI. 335, 335 (1933), http://www.currentscience.ac.in/Downloads/article_id_
001_11_0335_0337_0.pdf.
33 See AMRITA SHAH, VIKRAM SARABHAI: A LIFE 39–42 (2007) (discussing
Raman’s influence on Sarabhai).
34 Id. at 62.
35 Ajey Lele, India and Other Maturing Asian Space Enthusiasts, in YEARBOOK ON
SPACE POLICY 2012/2013 271, 273 (Cenan Al-Ekabi et al. eds., 2015).
36 K. KRISHNA MURTY, 50 TIMELESS SCIENTISTS 168 (2008).
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There are some who question the relevance of space activities in
a developing nation. To us, there is no ambiguity of purpose. We
do not have the fantasy of competing with economically ad-
vanced nations [in the exploration of the moon or the planets or
manned space-flight]. But we are convinced that if we are to play
a meaningful role nationally and in the community of nations,
we must be second to none in the application of advanced tech-
nologies to the real problems of man and society.37
However, Sarabhai was also conscious that getting too local-
ized in the name of indigeneity would hardly yield results, let
alone any international recognition. K. Krishna Murty writes,
“He [Sarabhai] realised the traditional approaches do not really
yield desired fruits and decided to harness the vast indigenous
technological skill and knowledge for a revolution in the fields
of communication, meteorology, remote sensing and educa-
tion.”38 The idea was not to allow an integration of Indian and
Western space sciences; rather, it was to set a dialectical connec-
tion between the culturally-given communitarian scientificism of
the ISP and the security-centered expansionist science of the
West. Asif A. Siddiqi paraphrases such stance in a postcolonial
tone: “[T]he Indian space program, as manifested in its technol-
ogy, its goals, and its architects, represents a kind of modernity
that is neither completely Western nor fully postcolonial—it is a
vision of modernity that is decentered, constantly mutating,
often contradictory, and globalized.”39
In 1963 and under Sarabhai’s leadership, India launched its
first rocket from Thumba Equatorial Launching Station at Tri-
vandrum.40 In this feat, India broke the prevalent concept of
rocket as a projectile; it instead created the notion of civilian
rockets, and the imagination of getting to know the universe
and drawing on its immense resources and possibilities.41 For
the first time, the streaking of a rocket toward the sky became a
symbol of hope for a gracious universe becoming the means for
the betterment of life on earth. This optimism of an entire cul-
ture, one which deemed the universe as the plenary conscious-
ness of humanity was well reflected in the words of Sarabhai:
“The natural scientist looking for the subtle links through which
37 G.S. Sachdeva, Space Policy and Strategy of India, in SPACE STRATEGY IN THE
21ST CENTURY: THEORY AND POLICY 303, 303–4 (Eligar Sadeh ed., 2013).
38 MURTY, supra note 36, at 167.
39 Siddiqi, supra note 28, at 435.
40 SHAH, supra note 33, at 126–28.
41 See id. at 128–32.
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the sun affects the earth and our lives has at last acquired in the
exploration of space a dramatic new capability for study.”42
Sarabhai set the patterns for the ISP by drawing on the
Nerhuvian socialist model of science as a “public thing” to pro-
mote national integration and economic self-sufficiency in the
larger interest of the nation. As if self-sufficiency and indigeneity
are self-fulling prophecies, two years later Science would report:
The Indians chose to manufacture foreign rockets . . . This is why
at least 12, and perhaps as many as 24, Centaures will be built in
Bombay. In contrast to the first payloads, most of the 20 sched-
uled to be flown during the year ending 31 March 1966 will be
constructed in India.43
The pattern set by Sarabhai was well supported by Homi J.
Bhabha, a friend and collaborator of Sarabhai on many fronts.
Bhabha believed in the “trickle-down theory of development,”
that benefits of knowledge production should reach even those
on the lower strata of society.44 Like Sarabhai, Bhabha also be-
lieved in indigeneity, for indigenous manufacturing of equip-
ment is the process of construction of cultural identities
through the product—the product then becomes a cultural cat-
egory and pride, while developing local expertise.45 Reviewing
the role and contributions of Bhabha to Indian science, George
Greenstein provides a striking illustration of the realization of
the egalitarian ambitions of the ISP through an indigenous ap-
proach dearer to Bhabha, which is worth quoting in full:
The most impressive example I know of is the Satellite Instruc-
tion Television Experiment. Under this so-called SITE program,
the government gave each village a television set, and educa-
tional programs were beamed nationwide via a geosynchronous
satellite. Care was taken that these programs concerned them-
selves with technology appropriate to village life: crop rotation,
water purification, and the like . . . The antennas by which these
satellite broadcasts were received themselves were a triumph of
appropriate technology—a mere few wires suspended from poles
stuck in the ground. The SITE experiment reached twenty thou-
sand villages and went on for a year; its place has since been
42 Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Rep. of the Legal Subcomm.
on Its Twenty-Third Session, U.N. Doc. A/7285, at 33 (1968).
43 Victor K. McElheny, India’s Nascent Space Program, 149 SCI. 1487, 1488
(1965).
44 George Greenstein, A Gentleman of the Old School: Homi Bhabha and the Devel-
opment of Science in India, 61 AM. SCHOLAR 409, 414 (1992) (internal quotations
omitted).
45 See id. at 417.
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taken by a series of half-hour broadcasts each night. This modest,
low-technology enterprise has done more to benefit the bulk of
India’s population than any amount of “Western-style” science.46
The communitarian nature of the ISP, relayed through a pro-
letarian textualism, also had a nation-building potential such
that the ISP became a means for national integration, thanks to
its recognition of the cultural specialties of the nation. However,
while the ISP was a cultural artifact, it co-opted the concept of
culture as a unified Indian culture inter alia “by constructing a
truly national television system.”47 Pretty much as Gandhi had
portrayed charkha (the spinning wheel) as symbolic of Indian
indigeneity and unification, the ISP has constructed an iconog-
raphy of satellites that has provided India the imagination of
indigeneity, self-sufficiency, and unification. Brian Frank, in a
piece appropriately titled Satellites and Ploughshares, succinctly
states in a similar vein: “[A]lmost any description of the Indian
space program includes a map, of all of India, without any
boundaries whatsoever, but showing all of the different centers
and laboratories.”48
After Bhabha’s and Sarabhai’s demise, it was only natural that
the ISP fell into the hands of Satish Dhawan, who—according to
Amulya K.N. Reddy—is an “embodiment of the fusion of sci-
ence and human values.”49 In setting the agenda for the ISP, as
if in reverence to the Vedic premise that sun is a representation
of Brahman, the cosmic self, Dhawan shared the sentiments of
the forefathers of ISP that the sun is the “driving force for al-
most everything on earth, be it the weathers, rivers, vegetation
or essentially life itself.”50 Hence, for him and his predecessors,
exploring the sun and the outer spaces of the earth offered im-
mense possibilities.51 However, Dhawan’s vision of the ISP was
not the least bit transcendental. Rather, he believed in translat-
46 Id. at 414.
47 Brian Frank, Satellites and Plowshares: The Potential Demise of the Indian Space
Program, 15 HARV. INT’L REV. 54, 55 (1993).
48 Id.
49 Amulya K.N. Reddy, A Tribute to Satish Dhawan, 37 ECON. & POL. WKLY. 195,
195 (2002).
50 SMT. RAJESHWARI KRISHNA, DR. SATISH DHAWAN: A BIOGRAPHY OF SATISH
DHAWAN IN ENGLISH (L.S. Seshagiri Rao ed., 2008).
51 Id.
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ing the possibilities space exploration offered for the benefit of
people at large.52
Dhawan was highly sensitive to the needs of the Indian popu-
lace and knew very well the benefits of bringing science to them.
Hence, he kept a bifurcated approach to science: 1) science as
an epistemology that broadened human understanding about
its existential reality; and 2) science as a means to “augment
human welfare or mitigate human suffering.”53 The space pro-
gram under Dhawan, writes Ramachandra Guha, was guided by
the spirit of inquiry and scientific humanism, which is obvious
from the fact that Dhawan believed that “satellite technology
must be used to garner information useful in agriculture and
other sectors of the economy, and to promote distance learning
in remote areas not easily served by other forms of
communication.”54
He was cautious and reflective in deploying space projects, for
he believed that any inappropriate intersection between the
technology and the socioeconomic contexts could be disastrous
for the nation. A foreign product, no matter its utility elsewhere,
cannot serve the socioeconomic context of India. Dhawan ex-
plained this in his Aryabhata Lecture delivered on August 2,
1985:
Many of the problems of the third world in S&T applications are
related to this issue and often are compounded by internal socio-
political weaknesses and the distortions generated by foreign gov-
ernments and international organizations which influence aid
programmes with the selectivity mechanisms based on parame-
ters derived from applications in the advanced countries.55
Dhawan’s efforts at indigenously developing home-based space
applications (designed to suit the socioeconomic conditions and
needs of the people) stemmed out of such caution and
reflections.56
Such an indigeneity in his approach, however, does not con-
strain him from exploring international possibilities. He wanted
the Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO) to be interna-
tionally connected through networks. The logic of such an ap-
52 Y.S. Rajan, An Article on Prof. Sathish Dhawan, Y.S. RAJAN: ARTICLES (2016),
http://www.ysrajan.com/index.php/articles/122-an-article-on-prof-sathish-
dhawan-by-y-s-rajan [https://perma.cc/TGJ4-Q7CH].
53 RAMACHANDRA GUHA, THE LAST LIBERAL & OTHER ESSAYS 89 (2004).
54 Id.
55 Rajan, supra note 52.
56 Id.
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proach lies in the prudence of Sarabhai that the ISP, though not
subscribed to international processes, should stay connected to
the political and international decision-making regarding
space.57 In pursuing this, Dhawan, following the footsteps of
Sarabhai, displayed the eclecticism of what could be called a “di-
alectic of diplomacy” for gaining “elusive insights.”58 This per-
spective can be best aligned with the concept of “fruitful
dialogues” of Martin Weber, “where the purpose is to present a
perspective on normalized practices, time-honored rituals, or at-
the-ready assumptions, which renders these strange, specific,
particular, and potentially subject to renegotiations.”59 Through
the dialectic mill of international forums, the ISP intended to
gain an enabling perspective on its uniqueness. This stance of
Sarabhai and Dhawan is a reflection of Marxist-Leninist interna-
tionalism that considers “international” as a dialectic site and a
social process for the discovery and rediscovery of the nationalist
self.60 A finer rationalism for this is the fact that Nerhuvian so-
cialism, which was the leitmotif of the ISP, has in it a large dose
of the Leninist scientific socialism as against the Trotskian dog-
matic socialism.61
The ISP’s commitment to self-sufficiency through indigeneity
was carried further by the ISRO’s subsequent chairs. In the early
1990s, on being unsuccessful at the international political level
to import cryogenic rocket technology due to neoliberal policy
objections, the ISRO attempted to indigenously devise the same
for its GSLV satellites. Though implementation of this project
was delayed due to unanticipated reasons, the ISRO eventually
succeeded in developing the indigenous cryogenic engine. The
technology was then used in many GSLV projects and in the
lunar mission Chandrayan.62
57 See From Fishing Hamlet to Red Planet: Book Review & Commentary, NEWSPACE
INDIA (Jan. 4, 2016), http://www.newspaceindia.com/from-fishing-hamlet-to-red-
planet-book-review-commentary/ [https://perma.cc/X7BN-EHUU].
58 Martin Weber, Critical Theory and Contemporary World Politics, 12 INT’L STUD.
REV. 444, 449 (2010).
59 Id.
60 See STEVEN C. ROACH, CRITICAL THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS: COMPLE-
MENTARITY, JUSTICE, AND GOVERNANCE 7–8 (2010).
61 See Saroj Malik, Socialist Ideas of Jawaharlal Nehru: Ideal and Reality, in
THOUGHT AND VISION OF JAWAHARLAL NEHRU 72, 72–74 (Suneera Kapoor ed.,
2005).
62 BRIAN HARVEY ET AL., EMERGING SPACE POWERS: THE NEW SPACE PROGRAMS OF
ASIA, THE MIDDLE EAST, AND SOUTH AMERICA 225 (2010).
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It is interesting that Indian citizens’ pride regarding space
achievements has such a cultural confidence to it: that the vic-
tory of the scientist is the victory of the nation, its culture, and
its civilization. Furthermore, in India, the masses idolize the sci-
entist as the liberator of the nation from its underdevelopment
of primitiveness and onto to the luxuries of modernity. For Indi-
ans, scientists are not simply national heroes but gurus or guides
who help the nation in re-discovering its national selfhood. The
scientist, for them, is the possessor of the knowledge about the
universe and about human existence in the grand scheme of
things.
A.P.J. Abdul Kalam, one of the rocket boys of Sarabhai who
would become the eleventh President of India, through his life
and work, has ignited a similar imagination in the collective con-
sciousness of Indians. Kalam believed that “science is the only
reliable way to understand the natural world, and its tools, when
properly utilized, can generate dazzling insights into material
existence.”63 In the spirit of such a faith, Kalam deemed himself
to be indigenous.
Kalam’s initiation into indigeneity was through Sarabhai, who
entrusted Kalam with the task of developing an indigenous
equivalent of the Russian RATO plane.64 Later on, when the ISP
entered into an active phase of indigenization, Kalam became
the pioneer of this so-called “swadeshi space programme.”65
Under this program, Kalam led the team that designed the SLV-
3 project, the first indigenously developed rocket to put a satel-
lite in low earth orbit.66 According to Arun Tiwari, Kalam’s ex-
colleague and biographer, SLV-3 was inspired by the Scout de-
sign of the United States. However, “though SLV-3 resembled
Scout in its morphology, the sub-assembly and the fuel assemble
were designed afresh by Indian scientists and engineers.”67
Despite the neoliberal era in which Kalam continued to work
for the ISP and India at large, he never subscribed to the aban-
doning of the the ISP’s indigenous science—even though global
ambitions of successive governments necessitated scientific in-
terdependence. Science did continue to assume a market char-
acter in India; however, the “civic science,” as Visvanathan calls
63 A.P.J. ABDUL KALAM & ARUN TIWARI, TRANSCENDENCE: MY SPIRITUAL EXPERI-
ENCE WITH PRAMUKH SWAMIJI 167 (2015).
64 ARUN TIWARI, A.P.J. ABDUL KALAM: A LIFE 68–73 (2015).
65 Id. at 71.
66 Id. at 77–79.
67 Id. at 78.
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it, of a Nerhuvian-Sarabhaian imagination about science contin-
ued to be the staple for fulfilling the socioeconomic needs of
the country, whereas on the global space market India provided
launch and related technological assistance to foreign states.68
In such transformative times, Kalam endeavored to hold the or-
ganic nature of the science of the ISP, while not foiling the
scope for the country in its political madness to sustain itself in
the markets. This was a vision well shared by C.V. Seshadri. As
Visvanathan paraphrases: “Science and technology have always
been and will always be the pursuit of exploitable knowledge
with all the artefacts of such exploitation. All we can do is seek
to minimize these effects.”69
On balance, the science of the ISP has a uniqueness—it has a
genealogy of self-inquiry, be it into the individual selfhood, the
collective selfhood (the nation), or the universe (cosmic self) in
its manifold microcosmic and singularly macrocosmic forms.
The inquiring subject of that science has a sense of “I-ness.” Vis-
vanathan explains: “there is the I of evolution, of cosmology, of
genealogy, of civilisation, [and] of citizenship.”70 However, that
I-ness is today “denatured” and supplanted by considerations on
selfhood that are alien to science as it is understood and em-
ployed by the ISP.71 And yet, it is largely a science of the self—
the individual and the collective—which was divergent, socialis-
tic, sensual, playful, and communitarian. We have called it indig-
enous, for it had an imagination engendered by a civilizational
glory.
V. THE-SCIENCE OF INTERNATIONAL SPACE LAW
International space law is largely a product of bipolar politics
and consensual diplomacy from the Cold War era. The Cold
War, despite the political thematization it has been subject to,
was primarily fought on science. Further, it should be noted that
the science of the Cold War was the “big science,” which con-
68 See C.V. Seshadri & Shiv Visvanathan, The Laboratory and the World: Conversa-
tions with C.V. Seshadri, 37 ECON. & POL. WKLY. 2163, 2164 (2002) (discussing civic
science); see also The ISRO Journey: A Fascinating Tale of India’s Attempts Towards
Space Domination, HOMEGROWN (July 10, 2015), http://homegrown.co.in/article/
27376/the-isro-journey-a-fascinating-tale-of-indias-attempts-towards-space-domi-
nation/ (discussing India’s market participation) [https://perma.cc/S2VX-
EKNQ].
69 Seshadri & Visvanathan, supra note 68, at 2170.
70 Id. at 2164.
71 Id.
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tained ambition and nationalism that “ran counter to the values
of open cooperation and competition that scientists traditionally
believed should characterize their work.”72 No matter its
politicized image and character, the Cold War’s connection to
space diplomacy has become a framework to analyze current in-
ternational space law.
Big science, both generally and in space exploration specifi-
cally, has heavy traits of nationalism and patriotism, which is
what catapulted it to the most popular type of science.73 Big sci-
ence clearly outplayed the little science’s genealogy of space ac-
tivities mainly because of the prioritization and the resultant
institutionalization of the big sciences.74 Most of the arguments
supporting the ingenious creativity of scientists doing little sci-
ences were dwarfed before the fiscal reckonings and the payoffs
of big sciences.75 Space activities in no time completely espoused
the big science.
Managing big science was really a nascent art, the “politics of
science.”76 It was imperative to optimize fund allocation as well
as management and allocation of human resources.77 The whole
process was in fact an institutionalization of scientific talents and
resources under a liberal agenda to out-power the political op-
ponents abroad. However, internationally, big science was not
only a matter of prestige for nations, but also a means of dia-
logue between them. Hence, the big science therein needed to
have a nonaligned image so that its dialectic possibilities were
best utilized by states.
Accordingly, international space law became the dialectical
medium for the Cold War combatants—it also maintained an
image of neutrality in terms of its normative and communitarian
aspirations. As the 1963 Declaration on Outer Space states, in-
ternational space law aims to “contribute to broad international
co-operation in the scientific as well as in the legal aspects of ex-
72 MARY JO NYE, BEFORE BIG SCIENCE: THE PURSUIT OF MODERN CHEMISTRY AND
PHYSICS 1800–1940 225 (1996).
73 ANDREW FEENBERG, ALTERNATIVE MODERNITY: THE TECHNICAL TURN IN PHI-
LOSOPHY AND SOCIAL THEORY 44 (1995).
74 See Comm. on Solar-Terrestrial Research et al., A Space Physics Paradox, NAT’L
ACAD. PRESS 15, 16–17 (1994).
75 See, e.g., G.B. Kistiakowsky, Allocating Support for Basic Research and the Impor-
tance of Practical Applications, BULL. ATOMIC SCIENCES 12, 17–18 (1966).
76 See DEBAL DEB, BEYOND DEVELOPMENTALITY: CONSTRUCTING INCLUSIVE FREE-
DOM AND SUSTAINABILITY 405 (2009).
77 Id. at 406.
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ploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes.”78 While
the normative requirement of the peaceful uses of outer space
neutralized the domain, an unconditional freedom for the pur-
suit of science set the dialectical stage.79
Just as “peaceful purposes” did, scientific purposes also re-
ceived a conceptual treatment in space law forums. This treat-
ment has since sufficiently accommodated the grand ambitions
of the big science. Mr. Luedeking, the German representative to
the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer
Space (UNCOPUOS), explains: “Exploration missions should
serve a clear scientific purpose such as basic research into the
origin of the solar system for example. They should focus on
projects of high scientific value with great potential for innova-
tion including in non-space domains.”80 Interestingly, the big
science of the international space program, as Mr. Luedeking
has helped us imagine, was not just a desire to conquer outer
spaces and planets through bigly funded projects (and thereby
get new dimensions to look at human existence). It also was the
international opponent on the other side of the dialectical
loop—to prove that we have more science than you—the more
it is, the politically more advantageous the science is. The Outer
Space Treaty has cast the die for such power plays in its own
preamble, wherein science is set as the fulcrum for power
purchases: international space law desires to “contribute to
broad international co-operation in the scientific as well as the
legal aspects of the exploration and use of outer space.”81
However, in international space law, science has no violent
characterization as such because the big science is about bigness
in terms of money and ambition rather than physical violence.
That said, we cannot ignore the prevalent imagination that the
domain of space has violent and destructive possibilities. Hence,
78 G.A. Res. 18/1962 (XVIII), 1, Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the
Activities of States in the Exploration and Uses of Outer Space (Dec. 13, 1963)
(emphasis added).
79 Many political forces and pressures contributed to the emergence of such a
dialectical position. See EDYTHE E. WEEKS, OUTER SPACE DEVELOPMENT, INTERNA-
TIONAL RELATIONS AND SPACE LAW: A METHOD FOR ELUCIDATING SEEDS 51–54
(2012).
80 Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, 24th Sess., U.N. Doc.
COPUOST/T.629 (June 1, 2011), at 10, 11, http://www.unoosa.org/pdf/tran-
scripts/copuos/COPUOS_T629E.pdf [https://perma.cc/L9XX-S9PN].
81 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration
and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies 207,
Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 205.
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international law has predicated (often equated) scientific pur-
poses on peaceful uses.82 Interestingly, peaceful uses of outer
space is a repetitive affirmation in every international space law,
which, in a sense, shows acknowledgment that there is a poten-
tial for violence if care is not taken.
There are more hints we can take from the language of these
binding agreements. Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty of
1967 has a strange and instructive juxtaposition of scientific pur-
pose and military purpose. It dictates that “establishment of mili-
tary bases, installations and fortifications, the testing of any type
of weapons and the conduct of military manoeuvres on celestial
bodies shall be forbidden.”83 Though these are not necessarily
violent activities, some can be. That means they are forbidden
because they are military activities that have the possibility of
violence ingrained in them. However, the clause further states
that “[t]he use of military personnel for scientific research or
for any other peaceful purposes shall not be prohibited.”84 So
basically, if performed in the name of science, the violent pos-
sibilities of science is not as constrained as international space
law perhaps intended.
What does this sort of a semantic deconstruction convey?
First, it presumes that science, which is violent per se, when
predicated on peace, fetches best possible outcomes for human-
ity—science may be violent, but it alone can bring progress. Fur-
ther, outer spaces, moons, and other celestial bodies are
possible sites of the modernization of human imagination. How-
ever, if not properly regulated, war grounds of military bases
could invade in the name of science. International space law
hence finds that science is the classiest language, the language
of power, which can impose order in space. In that perspective,
Article IV is a fine illustration of science complementing the use
of military in outer space, thereby determining the social
process.
Second, it highlights the dispute on the definition of “peace-
ful”—is peaceful properly construed as “non-military” or “non-
aggressive”?85 Such a dispute exists because international space
law does not prohibit military activities performed for scientific
82 See id. at 206–08.
83 Id. at 208.
84 Id.
85 See, e.g., Bin Cheng, Military Use of Outer Space: Article IV of the 1967 Space
Treaty Revisited, in THE UTILIZATION OF THE WORLD’S AIR SPACE AND FREE OUTER
SPACE IN THE 21ST CENTURY 305 (Chia-Jui Cheng & Doo Hwan Kim eds., 2000).
130 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE [83
purposes. The non-American camp always held that peace
means non-military, rather than non-aggressive. As Ivan Vlassic
states, “If peaceful means non-aggressive [only], then it follows
logically—and absurdly—that all nuclear and chemical weapons
are also peaceful, as long as they are not used for aggressive pur-
poses.”86 However, Vlassic’s concern, though right in its own
way, would be defeated by the determining role of science such
that it is only aggressive activities (that is, activities which have
use of “force,” as physics primers would say), and not military
activities per se, which international space law prohibits. Military
activities, as long as they are for scientific purposes, are deemed
peaceful. The violence that science has disgorged in interna-
tional space law has caused the term “peaceful” to be limited to
the narrow construction of non-aggressive.
In sum, the violence of science in international space law is a
violence spewed by the “socialness of science,” which is a privi-
leged social participation that science has in collective social de-
cision-making. Particularly in the case of international space law,
science has become the standard for measuring political power,
as well as a medium for states to communicate power between
one another. Further, science became the arbiter and determi-
nant of meanings—it has a hermeneutical mission to infuse
meanings in words and contexts in international space law so
that Cold War combatants speak to each other through science.
The science here is thus a far cry from science of the ISP—a
representation of universality, self-sufficiency, and national inte-
gration—which almost certainly makes international space law
less apposite an inspiration and guidance for the making of a
national space legislation for India.
VI. INDIGENIZING SPACE LAW: A NATIONAL
SPACE LEGISLATION?
A. WORK THUS FAR: A FORGETFULNESS BETWEEN MODERNITY
AND CLASSICISM
It has indeed been the ambition of the Indian space commu-
nity to have legislation that contains the indigenous imagina-
tions and experiences of the Indian space scientists that dreamt
the dream of a scientifically and technologically self-sufficient
nation. As Saligram Bhat writes, “In India, scientists have repre-
sented most perspectives on space exploration and hope to
86 Id. at 321 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
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make national legislation in due course based on national expe-
rience.”87 A law based on the national experience of the con-
cerned communities will have the cultural content that brings
pan-temporal appropriateness and cultural sufficiency to that
law. However, of late, there is a tendency to the contrary. Sir
John Mummery writes that there is a “tendency, pushed forward
by political and business agendas, to value experiment at the
expense of experience, to be over-optimistic and short-term
about the potential of untried laws and what might be achieved
by them in the long term.”88 Mummery says that such naivety
and haste will have long-term costs on the legal system and the
nation.
This does not always have a healthy effect on the development of
the law or on the wider social order. You can underestimate the
importance not just of people, history and geography but of tra-
ditions and traditional concepts of law, justice and national and
local cultural identity, which may lead to disillusionment with re-
mote legislators and courts.89
The efforts of the Indian space community toward making na-
tional space legislation thus far has been in such a false piety to
a dazzling sense of modernity. It is a sense to cut loose from an
indigeneity to certain categories of modernity which makes very
little sense to the indigenous Indian self. Yet, the Indian self is
all in for modernity because it promises progress as contextual-
ized in Western discourses. It is out of this sense of modernity
that scholars ask the questions: Does India need a space legislation?
Why does India need a space legislation? Ironically, the answer to
both questions is that India needs space legislation, for India is
neoliberally modern, searching for participatory rights and op-
portunities in the market.
When speaking about national space legislation for India,
scholars emphasize necessity created by the market rather than
the indigeneity of the ISP—it is an abjectness that plausible al-
ternatives do not exist. A scholarly writing evinces the moral ne-
cessity: “[T]he author is guided by the belief that national space
law ought to be legislated for the purpose of creating clear and
transparent regulatory guidelines for domestic industry in order
87 Saligram Bhatt, Inspiration to Humankind from Space Law and Science and Expe-
rience in India, 35 J. SPACE L. 291, 292 (2009).
88 Sir John Mummery, Links with National Courts, in MAKING COMMUNITY LAW:
THE LEGACY OF ADVOCATE GENERAL JACOBS AT THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE
100, 109 (Philip Moser & Katrine Sawyer eds., 2008).
89 Id.
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to accelerate investment and to ensure the growth and develop-
ment in this capital intensive - high return strategic sector.”90
However, the necessity to espouse the above said modernity is
also policy-documented. “Indian Space Research Organisation
(ISRO) has initiated a process of formulating a National Space
Act for India for supporting the overall growth of space activi-
ties, with enhanced levels of private sector participation and of-
fering more commercial opportunities.”91 Such sentiments are
also widespread, reports a national daily: “[India] started the
space programme and later entered the global market with
products and satellite launches, [yet] India does not have a
space law to protect sovereign, public or commercial
interests.”92
Other scholarly expositions on the topic, however, are less
motivated by the call of a market modernity. Rather, their moti-
vation stems from normative concerns. Call it the dualist, deep-
seatedness of the Indian legal system apropos of international
obligations; call it the normative ingenuity of Indian scholars
concerning the effectuation of international law at the domestic
level; either way, there has been a demand for creating domestic
law in order to sift through the obligations India has incurred
under space treaties.93 Ranjana Kaul explains this standard In-
dian position on international law vis-a`-vis outer space:
The requirement to harmonize international treaty obligations is
inherent in the international treaties [on space law]. Harmoniza-
tion thus represents the essential physical link, as it were, be-
tween a nation’s universally declared stand in the international
arena on outer space (or any other matter) and its national ap-
plication. In its spatial context harmonizing treaty obligations
with national law demonstrates the continuing resolve of a coun-
try to support the imperative need for collective measures to
90 Ranjana Kaul, Does India Need National Space Laws?, National Space Legis-
lation: A Blueprint for India, Regional Space Conference on Bringing Space Ben-
efits to the Asia-Pacific Region, Bangalore 27–29 June, 2005 (on file with the
author).
91 Press Release, Dept. of Space, Gov’t of India, National Space Law (Dec. 16,
2015), http://pib.nic.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=133383 [https://per
ma.cc/TK4S-9P4W].
92 Experts Bat for Space Law, THE HINDU (July 19, 2015, 2:28 AM), http://www
.thehindu.com/sci-tech/india-needs-space-law-say-experts/article7438953.ece
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manage international affairs in such a way as to ensure that outer
space does not become yet another battleground for nations.94
In a similar vein, V.S. Mani holds that the effectuation of in-
ternational obligations through domestic laws help promote
community aspirations regarding space otherwise remaining
dormant in policy documents—only a “well thought out space
law would go hand in hand with a well thought out space pol-
icy.”95 He calls for a domestic implementation of space treaties
through the enabling provisions of the Constitution of India.
The imaginations of national space legislation for India are
thus caught between the binaries of a madness for modernity
and fixation with the classicism of international law, leaving
hardly any consideration for the scientific and indigenous ambi-
tions of the forefathers of the ISP. Whatever little results are
available, this concept—when translated to legislation—will for-
get the ontology and genealogy of the ISP. All efforts have been,
perhaps inadvertently, in the direction of decentering the in-
digeneity—which is the leitmotif and related experiences and
practices of the ISP—evincing “[an] arrogance and ignorance,
and a lack of respect and humility in the face of the lessons of
accumulated experience.”96 Mummery’s caveat is worth heeding
at this juncture: “Laws, like people, should be valued for what
they have accomplished and for the experience gained, even if it
is negative in some respects.”97
B. REFRESHING THE WORK: TOWARD NEWER ACTIONS
One question remains unasked by both the modernist and
classicist camps in the pursuit for why India, a state that is nor-
matively enlightened and has a legal self-consciousness of the
finest order, does not have space legislation. It is certain that
India was a compliant state that honored all the international
space treaty obligations. India’s approach to these treaty obliga-
tions is what George Pavlakos and Joost Pauwelyn call “princi-
pled monism.”98 That is, India practices not hard legal
94 Id.
95 V.S. Mani, Space Policy and Law in India and Its Relevance to the Pacific Rim, 35
J. SPACE L. 615, 631 (2009).
96 Mummery, supra note 88, at 109.
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98 See George Pavlakos & Joost Pauwelyn, Principled Monism and the Normative
Conception of Coercion Under International Law, in BEYOND THE ESTABLISHED LEGAL
ORDERS: POLICY INTERCONNECTIONS BETWEEN THE EU AND THE REST OF THE
WORLD (Malcolm Evans & Panos Koutrakos eds., 2011).
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structures, but legitimate, malleable policies that honor the am-
bitions and experiences of the actors in areas the policies sought
to regulate. Yet, there was neither any criticism of the justness
and fairness of India’s space policy, nor any empirical challenge
to the treaty breaches by India.
This prompts us to believe that, in regulating space, India was
better off with policies within its larger international ethic of
principled monism. That policy governance, until recently, was
motivated by a sense of philanthropy and communitarianism,
free from “technocratic agendas.”99 The subjective scope of the
policies helped India and the ISP rationally self-guide its indige-
nous ambitions and balance them against the demands of mo-
dernity.100 However, the ISP is often criticized for its modesty of
self-containment in policies, which is also a cause for the mad
rush toward national space legislation. But little such criticisms
are informed by the fact that such modesty is not because of any
normative constraints on India, but because of a cost-based ra-
tional choice of the state in the policy-spaces for the fulfillment
of the state’s sociopolitical and ideological ambitions.101
Even in the 1990s and 2000s, India’s space policy, as generally
believed, was not overturned by the massive wave of liberaliza-
tion. Rather, by establishing a commercial wing called the AN-
TRIX Corporation, which maintained the ISP’s “organic linkage
to ensure a high level of contribution and commitment to cus-
tomers’ programmes,” the ISP optimized the indigenous poten-
tial of Indian space science.102 Indeed, ANTRIX did not reinvent
the indigenous science of the ISP. Rather, it adopted the strate-
gic position of market bilateralism to sell the data India col-
lected and processed through its indigenously built satellites.103
Even during times of crisis in the global market, ANTRIX was
maxed out by strategic adaptations. Gopinath reports that the
best use of internal indigenous capabilities as against the alter-
native, popular strategy of “farming out” helped ANTRIX safe-
99 See Rajeswari Rajagoplan, The Growing Case for an Indian Space Policy, BROOK-
INGS (May 27, 2015), http://www.brookings.edu/research/The-Growing-Case-
for-an-Indian-Space-Policy/ [https://perma.cc/BJ8Z-PJ6A].
100 See id.
101 See Mukund Kadursrinivas Rao et al., Future Indian Space: Renewing Policy
Dimensions, COORDINATES (Jan. 2015), http://mycoordinates.org/future-indian-
space-renewing-policy-dimensions/ [https://perma.cc/Y7BE-KW8V].
102 See C. Gopinath & L. Surendra, Antrix Corporation Limited: A Strategy for the
Global Market, 28 CASE RESEARCH J. 1, 2 (2008) (internal quotations omitted).
103 Id. at 7.
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guard the ISP’s goal of self-sufficiency.104 In fact, it is the
hermeneutic and dialectic scope of policy frameworks that ena-
bled ANTRIX to sustain effectually in the market.
If that is the case, why does India need national space legisla-
tion at all? It is possible that the need is just an innocent and ill-
informed demand for hard norms under a paradigm that falsely
assumes that “law is authoritative and capable of changing out-
comes irrespective of pre-existing conditions . . . legal institu-
tions once in place will be used in a bottom-up process of social
ordering where, in principle, everyone can mobilize the law to
further their ends.”105 Most of the demands for national space
legislation are fueled by an optimism that in ensuring better par-
ticipation in the global market, “domestic legislation can regu-
late more intensively and extensively than can the space law
treaties.”106
However, the demand for a national space legislation is based
on two misconceptions. First is that international space law contin-
ues to have a normative relevance for states, and hence any effectuation
of those norms through domestic enactments would make the states better
off. In fact, the historicity in which the said norm formation hap-
pened has increasingly been under criticism—S.G. Sreejith and
Yugank Goyal ask, does international space law’s “splendidly
normative architecture carry any more significance than an arti-
fact of [Cold War] diplomacy?”107 It does, but not as norms of a
normative legal system, but instead as a strategic information of
a non-normative character that would help states make rational
choices.108
The second misconception is that domestic legislation is a tool for
market access and market integration. Theoretically, this is in fact
the case—a domestic legislation that is in harmony with interna-
tional market standards can guarantee trade liberalization and
public regulation.109 However, a less thought-out national space
legislation that merely harmonizes to ensure market access is
likely to restrict the state’s pursuit of its domestic preferences.
104 Id. at 12.
105 Katharina Pistor et al., Social Norms, Rule of Law, and Gender Reality: An Essay
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RULE OF LAW 241, 254 (James J. Heckman et al. eds., 2010).
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Further, it would disregard the national and cultural specialties
of its space program.
This article does not argue that there should not be national
space legislation. Rather, it urges lawmakers to make a cost-ben-
efit analysis to determine whether the cost of such legislation
outweighs the prevailing policies. A blind adoption of national
space legislation, relying on models tested and proven in differ-
ent sociocultural contexts, would destroy the indigenous science
and the nationally-motivated vision of the ISP and its forefa-
thers. Hence, legislation or policy, whatever the cost-benefit
analysis would indicate, must have a means to defend the in-
digeneity of the ISP. This article proposes that the organic na-
ture of the science of the ISP must be the guiding force in
moving forward.
C. RESTORING INDIGENOUS GENEALOGY: THE ORGANIC-SCIENCE
FORMULA FOR LAWMAKING
Science is what enables the human exploration of outer
space. Hence, science will determine the sociopolitical condi-
tions that space exploration has potential to create. However, if
science, in its socializing potential, acts out of its caprices in a
totalizing manner, as “the-science” does, societies will have to
compromise their sociocultural and civilizational specialness.
Science will then potentially render societies unutilized in the
progressive development of the world. Martin Heidegger criti-
ques the falsity of science’s ways of rationalizing existence,
claiming that science is only a “condition posited by the will to
will itself, through which the will to will secures the dominance
of its essence.”110
However, as argued elsewhere in this article, science, save for
its vulnerability to yield to the needs of its possessors, is a gentle
and neutral force that can be put to the best constructive use of
society. However, for achieving that constructivity, science needs
to be accepted in its finest varieties. A framework for such a rec-
ognition is put forward by Visvanathan under the rubric “cogni-
tive justice,” which is a framework that “recognises the right of
different forms of knowledge to coexist . . . It demands recogni-
tion of knowledges, not only as methods but as ways of life.”111
110 MARTIN HEIDEGGER, PATHMARKS 231 (William McNeill ed., 1998).
111 Shiv Visvanathan, The Search for Cognitive Justice, SEMINAR 6 (2009), http://
www.india-seminar.com/2009/597/597_shiv_visvanathan.htm [https://perma
.cc/J59B-JQ6Y].
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Cognitive justice is not a framework that needs to be built. It is
here, there, and everywhere. It confers a right, and a claim
thereof, of cultures to actualize their ontology in epistemolo-
gies.112 Visvanathan further explains that cognitive justice is far
from a campaign. It is also “not a lazy kind of insistence that
every knowledge survives as is, where is.”113 Rather, it provides a
right to debate and dissent within models of dialectic, tran-
scending the “old dichotomies of tradition and modernity, of
development and underdevelopment.”114
Considering the indigenous nature of the science of the ISP
and the success and individuality it has brought for India, a na-
tional space policy or space legislation must first assert the “ac-
cumulated experience” of the nation in developing means for
exploring outer space.115 It should also have the cognitive justice
framework in its design. It should not be polarized (like the
Western science) but instead dialectically demonstrate the an-
tinomies in the totalizing approach of the-science, and invite all
sciences to dialectically engage with their own universal onto-
epistemological self.116 As Visvanathan succinctly states, “We
need ‘thought experiments’ that disturb both worlds and allow
both the self and other to confront each other in a kaleidoscope
of new experiences.”117
However, a blind adherence to indigneity and ignorance of
the increasingly globalizing world would be a temporal mistake.
True, indigeneity of the science distinguishes the ISP from the
totalization of the-science, but it can also provide a comparative
advantage in the global market. That is not to subscribe to the
view that India should assimilate to global competition (and its
ethics). Instead, imagine the possibility of the indigenous redis-
covering itself in the international institutions and processes.
Anthony B.L. Cheung shares a similar optimism by asserting
that, in a globalizing world, “Indigenous values and projects
count more than simply emulating some external [capitalist]
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takes place.”118 National policy and legislation can help contex-
tualize the interplay (the dialectic) of indigeneity and the global
forces of the indigenous sciences and the-science. Legislation
and policy could also create the opportunity for the indigenous
and the global self to engage with each other.
Finally, any future legislation must not become overtaken by
globalist forces that deviate from thoughtfulness. They also must
not self-betray by falling prey to the holism global discourses
often attributed to global phenomena. However, as stated ear-
lier, India’s effort at space legislation has fallen prey to a techno-
logical holism (a variety of global-holism paradigm) where some
are advocating for a legislation modeled on the existing space
legislations of a few states.
In overcoming such misguidedness, any effort at national
space legislation needs a proper theoretical approach to protect
the organic science that provided indigeneity to the ISP. Per-
haps a fine theoretical point of departure that can best guide
the case of the indigeneity of the ISP is to critically view the
process of the protogonization of technological holism as an er-
roneous modernist approach to an assemblage of science and so-
ciety.119 In the assemblage, science and society are far more
interwoven (than in a holistic framework) in a rhizomatic exis-
tence—“science itself can incorporate all forms of knowledges
and objects drawn from society and vice versa.”120 In modernity,
science as many other social assemblages is simply “fluid” and
“dissipated,” free from any iron-casted interconnectedness of
contexts that generally enable science to totalize other cosmolo-
gies and epistemologies. Hence, Alan Irwin and Mike Michael
assert that “the assemblage of science and society can be deter-
ritorialized—existing relations can be scrambled so that novel
relations emerge.”121 Further, Julie Allan explains the scope of
deterritorialization: “Deterritorialization seeks to knock existing
understandings and ways of acting into a different orbit or tra-
jectory. Its purpose is to undo the ‘processes of continuous con-
118 Anthony B.L. Cheung, The Politics of International Policy Learning in Public
Administration: Limits of Interdependence and Convergence under Globalization, in
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trol and instantaneous communication.’ It is a performative
breaking of existing codes which is also a ‘making.’”122
This type of a problematization of the modernist intertwining
of science and society should help in deterritorializing the hol-
ism of science that has brought indigenous science of the ISP
under the totalizing snare of the-science. Legislation and policy
should be seen as “opportunities to interrupt” the advancing dis-
cursivities of the-science on the colonized epistemic territo-
ries.123 Interruption is possible through dissenting imagination,
which may or not be within a legislation. However, Allan, based
on a certain Scottish experience, cautions that legislation has
the risk of creating “rigid striations” which can constrain imagi-
nation by creating normatively stronger boundaries and
territories.124
India needs a finer and more rational imagination on the in-
clusion of its indigeneity in the policy, and in legislation if re-
quired. While there has been some policy effort for such an
inclusion on the part of the ISRO and the government of India,
all efforts at national space legislation miss on that front. Legis-
lative effort thus far has been directed toward territorializing the
domination of the-science through the above holistic approach,
which is at the cost of the exclusion of the indigeneity of the
ISP. The proposed deterritorialization, by whatever means,
should emphasize the historically proven experience of the by-
gone subjects. Their experience includes technologizing science
in its organic, indigenous form and the success they obtained
thereof. The dialectical might of indigenous science should dis-
turb territories colonized by “the-science” to create what James
Joyce calls a “chaosmos,” which is a vantage point to explore the
performative possibilities of a deterritorialized and refined
imagination.
VII. CONCLUSION
This article explores the debate surrounding the need for na-
tional space legislation in India. What prompted such an in-
quiry, however, was the concern that the national space
legislation project overlooks the indigeneity of the science of
the ISP, a science that is ontologically closer and more meaning-
122 JULIE ALLAN, RETHINKING INCLUSIVE EDUCATION: THE PHILOSOPHERS OF DIF-
FERENCE IN PRACTICE 62, 63 (5th ed. 2008) (citations omitted).
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ful to the actual existence of humanity in the world, unlike “the-
science” which totalizes certain vested interests. Moreover, the
science of the ISP is cherished, and helped the nation’s coming-
to-consciousness, achieving national self-sufficiency and pres-
tige. That science is fairly different from the aggressive space
science that is employed globally for power-gains. It also is vastly
different from the big science of international space law
through which states flaunt their power to each other.
This article has built a framework to examine the nature of
Western science, which this article entitles “the-science.” It ex-
amined the following: 1) the extent of the-science in human
space exploration; 2) the catechistic approach of international
space law to social issues, which is a false piety to human con-
cerns; 3) the proletarian ambition of the men of the ISP; and 4)
the falsity in the approach, particularly of the academia, toward
the making a national space legislation in India. In that process,
the article has achieved the following:
First, the article captured the discursive transformation of
Western science from being merely a science to becoming “the-
science.” In its totalizing potential, Western science has de-
stroyed the essentialist particularities of other knowledges, ren-
dering them epistemic outcasts.
Second, the article has verified that the type of science that
both enables human space exploration and underlies the law
regulating the use and exploration of outer space is none other
than “the-science.” Hence, under the totalizing snare of “the-
science,” human space exploration, which ought to have been
advancing human wellbeing, has become a tool of amorality.
Third, the article has constructed an Indian narrative on the
use and exploration of outer space. That narrative opens up the
possibility for reconstruction by providing an otherness to the
epistemological singularity and a segmentarity forged by “the-
science.” The alterity of the Indian narrative is particularly con-
structive for it is untouched by ontologies that is alien to the
Indian indigenous self.
Fourth, the article analyzed the concept of national space leg-
islation for India and the work associated with it. The analysis
finds that the demand for national space legislation is primarily
an artifact of academia in order to have a paradigm to debate
about the normative strength of space law. Further, the article
favored policy for effectively governing the exploration and use
of outer space, yet it did not discredit legislation. Rather, it sub-
mitted a theoretical framework to explode falsities, if any, in the
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imagination of national space legislation and to effectually ra-
tionalize efforts in that direction.
VIII. MID-PUBLICATION AUTHOR UPDATE
On November 21, 2017, India’s Department of Space, re-
leased the Draft Space Activities Bill, 2017 (Draft Bill), opening
it up for comments from the stakeholders and the public. The
Draft Bill is largely modeled on the “Model Law on National
Space Legislation” (Model Law) formulated by the International
Law Association. The main objective of the Model Law is to
“serve as an instrument of harmonizing and developing space
law.”125 Even as India subscribes to the Model Law, which aims
at worldwide harmonization of space activities, the Draft Bill rec-
ognizes the uniqueness of the ISP and the activities thereof. In
pursuance to this, as the Explanatory Note attached to the Draft
Bill states, “necessary customization” was done of the Draft Bill
to “match with the Indian context.”
However, there is modesty in terms of customizing the Draft
Bill to the Indian context. First, the Draft Bill expressed the
need to create enabling conditions to further the uniqueness of
the ISP. Then, in furtherance to this ambition, the Draft Bill
reaffirmed the constitutional powers of the Central Government
under Article 73 of the Constitution of India.126 This is the cus-
tomization that the Draft Bill takes pride in. In fact, this is just a
case of a principal legislation enabling the Central Government
to create a regulatory mechanism for governing space activities.
Even in the absence of legislation, by virtue of Article 73, the
Central Government can exercise executive powers, which are
elaborated in Chapter III (Space Activities Regulatory Mecha-
nism) of the Draft Bill. Certainly, Article 73 and the powers of
the Central Governmental arising from it can be debated. How-
ever, if we keep apart the constitutional discourses on the limita-
tions and possibilities of Article 73, but for the delegation of
125 There are also critical discourses on the inclusiveness of the Model Law. See,
e.g., Sandeepa Bhat & Arthad Kurlekar, A Discourse on the Remodeling of ILA Model
Law on National Space Legislation, 41 J. SPACE L. 1 (2017).
126 Article 73 (1) Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, the executive
power of the Union shall extend—
(a) to the matters with respect to which Parliament has power to
make laws; and
(b) to the exercise of such rights, authority and jurisdiction as are
exercisable by the Government of India by virtue of any treaty
or agreement.
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space governance to the Central Government, what does the
Draft Bill aim to achieve? And, even without the Draft Bill, has
not what the Draft Bill aims to achieve—the Central Govern-
ment governance—been in fact the case? One space columnist
writes that the Draft Bill has little room “to alleviate what is both-
ering India’s private space players.”127 It advances nothing.
Either way, empowering the Central Government to establish
a space governance (framework) is reassuring from the perspec-
tive of protecting the ontology of the ISP. This is for two rea-
sons. First, it gives substantial imaginative space for the Central
Government to overcome the risk of falling into the grids of the
Model Law and any efforts at harmonization thereof, creating
scope for “domestic scientific experiences” and “domestic pref-
erences” to continue to guide India’s space pursuits. Similar
practices have been followed to a certain extent by the Central
Government through the Department of Space including exper-
iments in institutionalization (e.g., ANTRIX and its “optimizing
approach” to the indigeneity of the ISP). Second, it helps create
the dialectic possibilities by pitting India’s scientific indigeneity
against global space technology. The possibilities here range
from the Central Government creating scope for general excep-
tions to National Treatment given to ingeniously developed
technology, all the way to “licensed production” of technology.
Available reports from the stakeholders do not necessarily af-
firm the adoption of the Draft Bill as it is. Stakeholder concerns
largely revolve around the general-ness of the Draft Bill and its
limited utility for private players. As a result, few shareholder
comments address the desire to protect the identity of the ISP.
At this juncture, India should create a critical space for further
dialogue and debate on the possible legislation. If reconsidera-
tion happens, there must be restraint from falling prey to the
more ill informed legislation campaigns. Of the many things it
may include, the possible legislation must include the memory
of India’s scientific experiences and the ontology of ISP.
127 Narayan Prasad, Why You Should Care about India’s New Private Sector Space
Activities Bill?, THE WIRE (Nov. 29, 2017).
